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COMMENTS
TITLE IX OF THE ORGANIZED
CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1970:
AN ANALYSIS OF ISSUES ARISING
IN ITS INTERPRETATION
Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 19701 represents
Congress' attempt to eradicate the influence of organized crime in the
United States. 2  The basic substantive sections of Title IX prohibit
one from acquiring an interest in or conducting the affairs of an en-
terprise affecting interstate commerce through a pattern of rack-
eteering activity or collection of an unlawfil debt. 3  "Racketeering
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1970).
2. The impact of organized crime on American society is staggering. In 1969, the total
income from racketeering activity was estimated at 80 billion dollars, which is one-tenth of the
country's gross national product. See Hills, Combating Organized Crime in America, 33 FED.
PROB., Mar. 1969, at 23, 25. For a sobering account of the activities of organized crime, see
Johnson, Organized Crime: Challenge to the American Legal System, 53 J. CiuM. L.C. & P.S.
399 (1962). See generally D. PACE & J. STYLES, ORGANIZED CRIME: CONCEPTS AND CONTROL
(1975); McKeon, The Incursion by Organized Crime into Legitimate Business, Symposium: Or-
ganized Crime, 20 J. PUB. L. 117 (1971); Comment, The Strike Force: Organized Law En-
forcement v. Organized Crime, 6 COLUM. J.L. Soc. PROB. 496, 498-500 (1970); Comment,
Organized Crime: Developing Devices for Debilitating Desperados, 1970 L. Soc. ORD. 121,
121-22.
3. § 1962 of the statute provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of
an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the
meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or
indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition
of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of
investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control
of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this
subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his
immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activ-
ity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the
aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not
confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the
issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through -a pattern of racketeering activity
or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indi-
rectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
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activity" includes the commission of certain felonies under state law
or one of several federal offenses. 4  A "pattern" of racketeering activ-
ity is defined as two or more racketeering acts occurring within ten
years of each other. 5 Title IX provides that a criminal conviction
under the statute is punishable by a maximum fine of $25,000 and
imprisonment for a maximum of twenty years. 6 In addition, any
interest the defendant may have sustained or acquired in the enter-
prise must be forfeited to the United States. 7 The statute also allows
the government or private parties who have been economically in-
jured by such prohibited conduct to bring civil actions for damages. 8
Since its enactment, Title IX has been employed extensively by
prosecutors. Many questions, therefore, concerning the scope of the
statute have arisen which have required judicial interpretation. The
courts have faced three major problem areas in applying Title IX.
First, there has been some question concerning the meaning of the
term "enterprise." Courts have attempted to determine whether the
term is limited to legitimate businesses that have been infiltrated by
crime or if it also includes associations of individuals whose exclusive
purpose is to commit criminal acts. 9 Questions concerning whether
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions
of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
4. § 1961(1) of the statute provides:
(1) "Racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kid-
naping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other
dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprison-
ment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the
following provisions of ... United States Code: [18 U.S.C. §§201, 224, 471, 472,
473, 659, 664, 891-94, 1084, 1341, 1343, 1503, 1510, 1511, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954,
1955, 2314, 2315, 2421-24; 29 U.S.C. §§186, 501[(c)] ..., or (D) any offense in-
volving bankruptcy fraud, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious ...deal-
ing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United
States.
5. § 1961(5) of the statute provides:
(5) "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering
activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of
which occurred within ten years ... after the commission of a prior act of rac-
keteering activity.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1970).
7. Id.' at subsection (a).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1970). Title IX also has procedural provisions for venue and process
(§ 1965), expedition of actions (§ 1966), evidence (§ 1967), and a civil investigative demand
(§ 1968). The provisions of Title IX are discussed in Legislative Note, Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 546, 622-27 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Organized Crime
Control Act].
9. See notes 20-101 and accompanying text infra.
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"enterprise," under the statute, includes foreign businesses and gov-
ernmental units also have been litigated.' 0 Second, the meaning of
the word "pattern" has created difficulties. Some courts have
suggested that, in order for two acts to constitute a pattern, they
must bear some relationship to each other." Defendants also have
argued that the acts forming the pattern must bear a specified degree
of proximity to the essential functions of the legitimate business.12
They have charged that the statute is unconstitutionally vague for
failing to clarify what, if any, peripheral acts would not violate the
law. Third, courts have disagreed concerning whether a potential de-
fendant must be a member of organized crime as a requisite for con-
viction under this act.' 3
This Comment will explore these three problem areas, analyze the
relevant holdings, and suggest guidelines for the future. It specifically
will demonstrate that the term "enterprise," properly construed,
should include foreign businesses and departments of government.
"Enterprise" should not, however, encompass associations the sole
purpose of which is to commit illegal acts. This Comment will also
explain why two racketeering acts need not be related to each other
to constitute a "pattern" and why the pattern of racketeering activity
is not required to be related in any central way to the business es-
sential functions. Finally, it will assert that defendants under the
statute need not be members of commonly recognized organized
crime groups.
THE SCOPE OF "ENTERPRISE"
A. "Enterprise" as Including Foreign Businesses
The scope of the term "enterprise" first was litigated in United
States v. Parness.14 In that case, the defendants were convicted of
violating Title IX by acquiring an interest in three foreign corpora-
tions through a pattern of racketeering activity.' 5  The defendants
10. See notes 14-19 and 102-109 and accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 110-136 and accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 137-144 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 145-154 and accompanying text infra.
14. 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
15. The defendants had transported stolen money in interstate commerce on two separate
days in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. These funds enabled the defendants to acquire interests
in corporations located in the Netherland Antilles. The court held that the two violations of 18
U.S.C. § 2314 were sufficient to constitute a "pattern of racketeering activity" in violation of
Title IX.
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unsuccessfully asserted that "enterprise" referred only to domestic
businesses. The statute defines "enterprise" as follows:
(4) "enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of indi-
viduals associated in fact although not a legal entity. 16
This definition does not refer to domestic businesses, nor does its
wording imply such a restriction. Furthermore, the Parness court ob-
served correctly that the legislative history of the act in no way
suggests that Congress intended only to deal with the infiltration of
domestic enterprises. 17 Congress' main concern in enacting Title IX
was the economic protection of businesses.' 8 It felt that the rack-
eteering activities of organized crime tended to stifle competition. In
Parness, the defendants invested in businesses by means of illegal
acts which precluded other individuals from legally investing in those
businesses. Thus, a legitimate American investor may have been in-
jured economically. This was precisely the type of harm that Con-
gress sought to prevent or redress in Title IX. The fact that a tainted
enterprise is not domestic has no bearing on the fact that economic
harm was caused. Thus, the Parness decision in itself is not astound-
ing. Its significance lies in the fact that subsequent courts have cited
it as authority for unrelated holdings.19
B. "Enterprise" as Including Associations Formed
Exclusively for Illegal Purposes
Since the enactment of Title IX, several cases have arisen in which
a group of individuals have associated for the sole purpose of con-
ducting an illegal society. 20 In these instances, the group or one of
its members has committed two or more illegal acts which qualified
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1970).
17. The Parness court felt that the congressional intent was reflected in a House Report
which stated that "any acquisition meeting the test of subsection (b) is prohibited without ex-
ception." 503 F.2d at 439, quoting H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in 2
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4033 (1970) (emphasis added by the court).
18. See notes 65-78 and accompanying text infra.
19. See notes 29-33 and accompanying text infra.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976) (defendants associated
for sole purpose of defrauding persons engaged in card games); United States v. Altese, 542
F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 736 (1977) (defendants associated for purpose of
conducting a gambling business); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975) (defendants associated for purpose of receiving and transmit-
ting wagering information); United States v. Winstead, 421 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. I11. 1976) (de-
fendants associated for purpose of conducting illegal gambling business); United States v. Moel-
ler, 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975) (defendants associated for purpose of committing arson);
United States v. Castellano, 416 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. N.Y. 1975) (defendants associated for
purpose of loaning money at usurious interest rates).
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as a "pattern of racketeering activity." 21  In addition, the acts of the
group have had a sufficient effect on interstate commerce. 22  Indict-
ments were brought under Title IX, charging that the group consti-
tuted an "enterprise" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)23
and that the affairs of the "enterprise" were conducted through a
"pattern of racketeering activity" in violation of section 1962(c).24
Defendants frequently have challenged the indictments, charging that
"enterprise" as defined in section 1961(4) refers to legitimate organi-
zations that have been infiltrated by crime, not associations formed
exclusively for illegal purposes. In all but one case, Unitel States v.
Moeller,2 5 the courts have held that the statute does apply to associa-
tions formed exclusively for illegal purposes.26 An analysis of relev-
ant precedent, rules of statutory interpretation, legislative intent, and
the operation of the statute itself, indicates, however, that this judi-
cial interpretation is unsound.
The question of whether "enterprise" refers to illegal organizations
first was raised in United States v. Cappetto.27 In that case, the
government alleged that the defendants had associated for the sole
purpose of illegally receiving and transmitting sports wagers. Injunc-
tive relief against further illegal activity was sought pursuant to sec-
tion 1964.28 The defendants objected to the injunction, claiming that
their illegal association was not within the scope of "legitimate" en-
terprises contemplated in section 1961(4). The court of appeals re-
jected this contention, holding that the term "enterprise" was to be
interpreted broadly, citing Parness for support.2 9 The court felt that
the Parness decision mandated a broad construction of "enterprise"
and thus reasoned that their holding was congruous with this deci-
sion. 30
21. See cases cited in note 20 supra. Castellano, however, involved collection of unlawful
debts, not a pattern of racketeering activity. Both actions are prohibited by Title IX.
22. The requisite effect on commerce apparently can be quite minimal. See note 85 and
accompanying text infra.
23. See note 16 and accompanying text infra.
24. See note 3 supra.
25. 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975). See notes 54 & 92 and accompanying texts infra.
26. The Moeller court's holding on this point is no longer law in the District of Connecticut.
See United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 736 (1977) and
notes 38-40 and 62-63 and accompanying text infra.
27. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
28. For a discussion of the injunctive relief authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 1964 as applied in
Cappetto, see Note, Equitable Law Enforcement and the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
25 DEPAUL L. REV. 508 (1976).
29. 502 F.2d at 1358.
30. The court also believed that one could not infer from the statute a restriction limiting
the scope of "enterprise" to legitimate organizations. Id. See note 42 and accompanying text
infra.
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The tenuity of the Court's reasoning is apparent. Congress' intent
in enacting Title IX was to deal effectively with the economic harm
resulting from criminal infiltration into legitimate organizations. 31
Since economic harm to Americans can result when a foreign business
is infiltrated or acquired by unfair means, as in Parness, it is not
reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to omit foreign
businesses from the scope of Title IX. Therefore, the Parness decision
did not stretch the meaning of "enterprise," nor did it mandate as
broad an interpretation of the word as suggested in Cappetto. 
32
Unfortunately, other courts subsequent to Cappetto have also
employed this same reasoning and, in addition, have cited Cappetto
as authority. 33 This line of cases exhibits poor analysis. It indeed
would be unfortunate for this pattern to continue.
Several courts, when confronted with the "legality" issue, have
turned to the wording of the statute to determine whether illegal
associations are included in section 1961(4). Most courts that have
attempted such statutory interpretation have concluded that the
statutory language does not limit its application to legitimate associa-
tions. 34 In United States v. Castellano,35 for example, the district
court noted that if Congress had desired to limit the application of
Title IX in this way, it could have done so "by simply adding the
word 'legitimate' in front of the word 'enterprise.' "36 The court also
stated that section 1961(4) "gave a very broad meaning to the term
'enterprise'." 37  In another case, United States v. Altese, 38 the Sec-
ond Circuit noted "the continued repetition of the word 'any"' in
several sections of the statute. 39 The court felt that the phrase "any
31. See notes 55-82 and accompanying text infra.
32. The impropriety of referring to Parness in support of the Cappetto holding also is noted
in Comment, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for
"Criminal Activity," 124 U. PENN. L. REV. 192, 203-04 (1975).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.
Ct. 736 (1977), (citing Parness, with strong dissent by Van Graafeiland, J., at 110); United States
v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing Parness and Cappetto); United States v.
Winstead, 421 F. Supp. 295, 296-97 (N.D. I11. 1976) (citing Cappetto); United States v. Castel-
lano, 416 F. Supp. 125, 128 (E.D. N.Y. 1975) (citing Parness and Cappetto).
34. For courts extending §1961(4) to include illegal associations, see United States v. Altese,
542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 736 (1977), United States v. Cappetto, 502
F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); United States v. Castellano, 416 F.
Supp. 125 (E.D. N.Y. 1975). United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975) is the
only reported case limiting the application of § 1961(4) to legitimate organizations based on
statutory interpretation.
35. 416 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. N.Y. 1975).
36. Id. at 129.
37. Id. at 127-28.
38. 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 736 (1977).
39. Id. at 106. In reality, the word "any" is only used twice in the definition of enterprise,
§ 1961(4).
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individual, partnership, corporation . . . or other . . . entity" dictated
the conclusion that illegal associations should be included within the
statutory scope. 40  Finally, in United States v. Cappetto,'4 1 the
Seventh Circuit stated merely 'that "there is nothing in [section
1961(4)] to suggest that the enterprise must be a legitimate one." 42
These attempts at statutory interpretation are not persuasive since
the courts failed to apply well-established canons of statutory con-
struction. One particularly relevant canon is the doctrine of ejusdem
generis which is applied when a statute lists several specific, narrow
categories, followed by a single broad one. 43  The rule generally pro-
vides that the broad or general category should be "construed to em-
brace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by
the preceding specific words." 44 To apply this doctrine to the defini-
tion of "enterprise," it is again necessary to examine section 1961(4):
(4) "enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of indi-
viduals associated in fact although not a legal entity.
The first step in applying ejusdem generis is, of course, to separate
the specific language from the general language. 45  The specific terms
in section 1961(4) are "individual," "partnership," "corporation," "as-
sociation," and "union." The general terms, which some courts have
held to include illegal associations, are "other entity" and "group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." The next
step is to determine the similarity among the specific terms. 46 It is
40. Id.
41. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
42. Id. at 1358. See also United States v. Castellano, 416 F. Supp. 125, 128 (1975).
43. Like all rules of statutory interpretation, the doctrine of ejusdem generis is an aid or
"axiom of experience," not a rule of law. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344
U.S. 218, 221 (1952), quoting Boston Sand Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928). Nor
are these canons applied to defeat clear legislative intent. 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.22, at 118 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
SUTHERLAND], quoting Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 88-89 (1934). For
purposes of § 1961(4), the result obtained through the application of ejusdem generis coincides
with the intent of Congress. See notes 55-82 and accompanying text infra.
44. 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 43, § 47.17 at 103. "[Tjhe doctrine of ejusdem generis
warns against expansively interpreting broad language which immediately follows narrow and
specific terms. [It] counsels courts to construe the broad in light of the narrow, in a common-
sense recognition that general and specific words, when present together, are associated with
and take color from each other." United States v. Insco, 496 F.2d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1974). See
also United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 736
(1977) (Van Craafeiland, J., dissenting).
45. See W. STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS: HOW TO USE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
100 (1975) [hereinafter cited as STATSKY].
46. Id.
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apparent that they all connote legal, legitimate organizations. In par-
ticular "partnership" indicates a legitimate business, since partnership
rights are not recognized if the objective of the partnership is il-
legal. 47 Likewise, the purpose of any corporation must be legal.4 8
Finally, the remaining general terms are construed in light of the
specific terms. 49  It follows that the words "other legal entity" or
"group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity"
refer only to other types of organizations with legal purposes. There-
fore, the doctrine of ejusdem generis indicates that all "enterprises" in
Title IX must be legitimate organizations. Courts which have applied
Title IX to illegal associations have ignored this concept.
Another well-established doctrine of statutory interpretation is that
of resolving ambiguities in penal statutes in favor of lenity.50  Essen-
tially, the doctrine requires that, if the meaning of a penal law is
uncertain, it is to be construed in favor of the defendant and against
the law's enforcement. 51  Thus, if it is not clear from section 1961(4)
whether "enterprise" includes illegal associations, then "enterprise"
should be construed to exclude illegal associations, as this would ben-
efit potential defendants. The canon of lenity is, of course, subject to
common-sense restrictions. Courts warn that the doctrine should not
be employed to violate legislative intent. 52  In the case of Title IX,
however, interpreting "enterprise" to include only legitimate organi-
zations does not violate the intent of Congress, as will be discussed
below. 53  As a result, application of the canon of lenity in this in-
stance rests on solid ground. 54
Legislative intent is also a reliable indicator of the proper construc-
tion and application of a statute. 55  Some courts that have held "en-
terprise" to include illegal associations have made weak attempts to
justify their holdings by citing congressional intent. For example, in
47. See Central Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Respass, 112 Ky. 606, 66 S.W. 421 (1902); J.
CRANE, PARTNERSHIPS § 21 at 66 (1938).
48. See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 3 (1960).
49. See STATSKY, supra note 45, at 100.
50. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808,
812 (1971); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955). See also 3 SUTHERLAND, supra note
43, § 59.03 at 6-8.
51. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
52. United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 26 (1948); United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527,
530 (1944). See also 3 SUTHERLAND, supra note 43, § 59.06 at 19.
53. See notes 55-82 and accompanying text infra.
54. In United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 59 (D. Conn. 1975), the court briefly
noted that the canon of lenity limits the application of Title IX to legitimate organizations.
55. It has been said that "[tihe intention of the lawmaker is the law." Piper v. Willcuts, 64
F.2d 813, 814 (8th Cir. 1933).
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United States v. Cappetto,5 6 the Seventh Circuit held that an illegal
gambling business constituted an enterprise within the scope of sec-
tion 1961(4). In support of its holding, the court referred to a Senate
Committee Report which noted that "the Federal Government must
... prohibit directly substantial enterprises of gambling." 57  The
court interpreted that phrase to mean that Congress viewed illegal
gambling associations as enterprises within the scope of section
1961(4).58 However, the Committee Report that the Cappetto court
cited referred to Title VIII of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, 59 not Title IX. Title VIII specifically deals with illegal gambling
businesses.60 It bears no relation to Title IX, but was merely a part
of the same omnibus act. Therefore one cannot assume without sup-
port that the congressional intent behind Title VIII was identical to
that behind Title IX. 61
Similarly, in United States v. Altese, 62 the court stated that Con-
gress demonstrated its intent in its comment that Title IX should be
"liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." 63  A super-
ficial observation of that phrase understandably could lead a court to
conclude that Congress intended to include illegal associations within
the scope of "enterprise." It also could be viewed as instructing
56. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
57. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
925 (1975), quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 72-73 (1969).
58. Id.
59. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1511, 1955 (1970).
60. Title VIII contains two substantive provisions. The first, 18 U.S.C. § 1511, prohibits
conspiracies to interfere with law enforcement with the intent of furthering illegal gambling
business. Under this section, one of the conspirators must be a government official or
employee. The second provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1955, prohibits gambling businesses that are
illegal under state law, that involve five or more persons, and that either are in operation for at
least 30 days or gross more than $2,000 in any single day. See McClellan, The Organized Crime
Act (S. 30) or its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties? 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 133-40
(1970) [hereinafter cited as McClellan]; Organized Crime Control Act, supra note 8, at 614-21.
See also notes 89-92 and accompanying text infra.
61. The impropriety of the Cappetto court's reliance in this portion of the Senate Report
was noted in United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 60 (D. Conn. 1975). In Moeller, the
court held that § 1961(4) did not include illegal organizations. It asserted that the excerpt from
the Senate Report, read together with Title IX, indicated that "when Congress wanted to pros-
cribe an illegitimate enterprise, it knew precisely how to do it." Id. The court felt that this
proscription was dealt with in Title VIII, not Title IX. Also, in United States v. Castellano, 416
F. Supp. 125 (E.D. N.Y. 1975), the court, while concurring with the Cappetto holding, appar-
ently felt compelled to comment on the Cappetto court's reasoning. However, the Castellano
court sought to justify the Cappetto court's reliance on Title VIII by claiming that the use of the
word "enterprise" in Title VIII's legislative history nevertheless could shed light on the in-
terpretation of § 1961(4). Id. at 131-32.
62. 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 736 (1977).
63. Id. at 106, quoting Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970).
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courts to ignore the canon of lenity.64 Such an interpretation, how-
ever, would misconstrue the "remedial purpose" intended by Con-
gress. As will be detailed below, the congressional intent was to
remedy the economic effects of criminal infiltration of legitimate or-
ganizations. 65  The congressional statement upon which Altese relied
merely instructed courts to apply Title IX liberally in order to deal
with the problem of infiltration and corruption. It did not authorize
courts to apply the statute beyond the scope of its purpose. 66
The published legislative history of Title IX, which is quite substan-
tial, convincingly indicates that Congress aimed exclusively at legiti-
mate organizations. 67 For example, the 'Senate Judiciary Committee
prefaced its report by stating that the purpose of Title IX was to
eliminate "the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into
legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce." 68  This
concept of infiltration was later discussed in detail under sections en-
titled "subversion of legitimate organizations," 69 "infiltration of
legitimate businesses," 70 and "takeover of legitimate unions." 71
Significantly, the late Senator John McClellan, 72 who introduced Title
IX in the Senate, 73 authored an article in which he clearly indicated
that the purpose of the bill was to remove "organized crime from our
64. The canon of lenity apparently can be modified by statutory mandate. See 3 SUTHER-
LAND, supra note 43, § 62.04 at 77. See also People v. Sciortino, 175 Cal. App.2d Supp. 905,
909, 345 P.2d 594, 596 (1959).
65. See notes 67-79 and accompanying text infra.
66. Thus, even if it is assumed that Congress did intend to suspend the canon of lenity, it
does not follow that illegitimate organizations should be included in § 1961(4).
67. No court which has held that illegitimate associations are included within the scope of
§ 1961(4) has attempted to support its holding with legislative history (e.g., committee reports,
debates, etc.) relative to Title IX. See United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct: 736 (1977); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); United
States v. Winstead, 421 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Ill. 1976); United States v. Castellano, 416 F.
Supp. 125 (E.D. N.Y. 1975). Undoubtedly, this is due to the fact that Title IX was aimed at
infiltrated, legitimate associations. See notes 68-79 and accompanying text infra.
68. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969).
69. Id.
70. id.
71. Id. at 78.
72. United States Senator from Arkansas.
73. 115 CoNG. REC. 9566 (1969). Senator McClellan, along with Senator Ervin of North
Carolina and Senator Hruska of Nebraska, introduced the Bill on April 18, 1969. In his remarks
that followed, Senator McClellan extensively spoke of Title IX in terms of legitimate organiza-
tions:
The problem, simply stated, is that organized crime is increasingly taking over
organizations in our country, presenting an intolerable increase in deterioration of
our Nation's standards. Efforts to dislodge them so far have been of little avail. To
aid in the pressing need to remove organized crime from legitimate organizations in
our country, I have thus formulated this bill which I am introducing today ....
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legitimate organizations." 74 The Senator cited examples of infiltra-
tion of businesses and indicated the need for Title IX. 75  Consistent
with published legislative history, Senator McClellan indicated that
the purpose of Title IX was to prevent and remedy the economic
effects of such infiltration. 76  This attitude is further manifested in
the Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee which stated that "or-
ganized crime ... poses a new threat to the American economic sys-
tem." 77 The Committee explained that Title IX "seeks essentially an
economic, not a punitive goal." 78
Hence, Title IX unquestionably was directed at the economic ef-
fects of the corruption of legitimate organizations. It-was not intended
to punish associations whose sole purpose is to commit illegal acts. 79
Courts that have interpreted "enterprise" to include illegal associa-
tions may have acted within the letter of the statute, but not within
its intent. The Supreme Court commented in Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States: 80
[F]requently, words of general meaning are used in a statute,
words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a con-
sideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances sur-
rounding its enactment . . .makes it unreasonable to believe that
the legislator intended to include the particular act. 81
Unfortunately, many of the courts' interpretations of section 1961(4)
appear to violate this principle. 82
This bill is designed to attack the infiltration of various congressional committees
and the President's Crime Commission.
Id. at 9567.
74. McClellan, supra note 60, at 141. The article was written prior to the passage of the act.
75. Id. at 142. He specifically referred to the infiltration of manufacturing concerns, banks,
and the A&P grocery chain. See 116 CONG. REC. 22772 (1970); 115 CONG. REC. 17504 (1969).
The operations of organized crime, and particularly La Cosa Nostra, are discussed in Wilson,
The Threat of Organized Crime: Highlighting the Challenging New Frontiers in Criminal Law,
46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 41 (1970).
76. McClellan, supra note 60, at 141.
77. S. REP. No. 617, supra note 68, at 77.
78. Id. at 81.
79. The legislative history behind Title IX is extensive. It is hardly necessary to examine it
further, since the continual theme of the infiltration of legitimate organizations is omnipresent.
See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 6709-10 (1970); 116 CONG. REC. 35193-94 (1970). Indeed, the
House, Senate, Justice Department and even those opposed to the act viewed Title IX as
applying only to legitimate enterprises. See United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 58-59
(D. Conn. 1975); Comment, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil
Remedies for "Criminal Activity," 124 U. PENN. L. REV. 192, 204-05 (1975).
80. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
81. Id. at 459.
82. The problem that the Holy Trinity Court faced was not unlike the "enterprise" issue in
Title IX. In that case, the Court considered 23 Stat. 332, c. 164, which forbade "any person ...
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Finally, the operation and the effect of the application of Title IX
indicate that it should not apply to illegal organizations. An analysis of
the operation of Title IX in conjunction with Illinois law will dem-
onstrate that an application of Title IX to illegal organizations leads to
an unwarranted increase in federal jurisdiction.
For purposes of this analysis, assume the following fact situation:
Two defendants associated for the sole purpose of selling bets upon
the result of football games. The bets were sold twice at the defen-
dants' place of employment located near the Illinois border to defen-
dants' fellow employees, some of whom were from out of state. The
total amount handled in both pools was no more than a few hundred
dollars. For this offense, an Illinois gambling statute imposes penal-
ties which could exceed one year's imprisonment.8 3
If one assumes further that the United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in this jurisdiction has held that section 1961(4) includes illegal
organizations, 84 a disturbing result arises. The two defendants would
qualify as forming an "enterprise" within section 1961(4) and, since
out of state residents were involved, the "enterprise" affected in-
terstate commerce. 85 The defendants also would be guilty of a
"racketeering act" which is defined as "any act ... involving ...
gambling . . . which is chargeable under State law and punishable by
[to] . . . in any way assist or encourage the importation or migration of [an] alien . . . to per-
form labor or service of any kind in the United States." The Court held that the statute did not
apply to a church that arranged for an alien to come to New York to serve as a Pastor. It was
recognized that the church's act did fall within the language of the law. However, the Court
refused to allow the statute to be construed in a manner that would contradict legislative intent
or lead to absurd results. 143 U.S. at 459.
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 28-1(a)(6) (1975) makes this conduct a gambling offense. A
second or subsequent conviction for selling pools is a Class 4 felony. Id. at § 28-1(c). The
maximum term of sentence for a Class 4 felony is three years imprisonment. Id. at § 1005-8-1(b)
(5).
84. Indeed, this is the current position in the Seventh Circuit. See United States v. Cap-
petto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1970). Conceivably, a much lesser effect on interstate commerce
than that set forth in this situation could satisfy the requirements of Title IX. Cases dealing with
the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, which prohibits extortionate conduct that affects interstate
commerce, have held that an arguably de minimis effect on commerce is sufficient to bring the
statute into play. See United States v. Crowley, 504 F.2d 992, 997 (7th Cir. 1974). One of the
more extreme examples of the minimal commerce requirement is United States v. Irali, 503
F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975). In that case, the defendant, a city
clerk, had extorted money from a woman who had applied for a liquor license. Because her
tavern received liquor from local companies who secured their supplies from out of state, the
court held that the extortion sufficiently affected commerce under the Hobbs Act. Id. at 1298.
Thus, it is quite obvious that the commerce requirement in federal criminal statutes is unsub-
stantial. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the commerce requirements of Title IX are
likewise nominal. See generally Comment, The Scope of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Under
the Commerce Clause, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 805.
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imprisonment for more than one year." 86  Since two such acts were
committed within ten years, the defendants carried out a "pattern of
racketeering activity." 87 As a result, the defendants violated section
1962(c), having conducted the affairs of an "enterprise" through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity. They are now subject to a maximum
$25,000 fine and twenty years imprisonment. 88
The absurdity of the severe penalties which can be imposed upon
such relatively minor criminal conduct is evident immediately. How-
ever, a more serious problem is the automatic grant of federal juris-
diction. In this instance, the federal courts are forced to open their
doors to a prosecution of a gambling association involving only two
defendants and a few hundred dollars. Although Congress' authority
to grant such jurisdiction, if it so chooses, will not be disputed, it
appears that Congress did not intend the federal courts to be in-
volved in such minor offenses. Part of Title VIII of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 197089 deals with illegal gambling businesses.
However, the statute is not violated unless five or more persons are
involved 9 and the business is "in substantially continuous operation
for a period in excess of thirty days" or have a gross revenue of
$2,000 in any given day. 91 The reasonable inference is that Congress
chose to invoke federal jurisdiction in cases involving gambling
businesses only when the operation was quite substantial. 92  A con-
struction of "enterprise" in Title IX to include illegal associations re-
sults in relatively insubstantial operations being brought under federal
jurisdiction, contrary to the clear congressional intent apparent in
Title VIII. 93
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1970).
87. Id.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1970).
89. Id. § 1955. See notes 59-60 and accompanying text supra.
90. Id. § 1955 (b)(1)(ii).
91. Id. § 1955 (b)(1)(iii).
92. See United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 59 (1975).
93. In addition, expansion of federal jurisdiction has been viewed as undesirable. For exam-
ple, in Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971), the defendants were convicted of violating
the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952. The statute prohibits interstate travel with intent to "pro-
mote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or
carrying on, of any unlawful activity." Id. § 1952(a)(3). The defendants in Rewis operated an
illegal lottery which attracted out of state patrons. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the statute was not violated "solely because [the defendants'] activity [was] at times patronized
by persons from another State." 401 U.S. at 812. Significantly, the Court noted that if the
statute were overly expansive, it "would alter sensitive federal-state relationships, could overex-
tend limited federal police resources, and might well produce situations in which the geographic
origin of customers, a matter of happenstance, would transform relatively minor state offenses
into federal felonies. " Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, the problem of an overloaded federal doc-
ket is not to be taken lightly. In 1976, there were 171,617 filings in the district courts, which
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Of course, not all acts of "racketeering activity" are as insubstantial
as the one discussed in the above hypothetical situation. Title IX de-
fines racketeering acts to include certain federal offenses, 94 many of
which are serious and have undoubted effects on interstate com-
merce. However, an analysis of these offenses also indicates that
Congress did not intend "enterprise" to include purely illegal organi-
zations. Separate consideration will be accorded to instances in which
racketeering acts (1) further no other interest, but are committed only
for their own sake, (2) further illegitimate or illegal interests, and (3)
further legitimate interests or enterprises. The analysis will dem-
onstrate that Title IX yields benefits peculiar to other federal statutes
only in the last situation in which the racketeering acts are connected
with legitimate associations.
Considering the first situation, Title IX enumerates certain federal
offenses the commission of which could logically be the sole purpose
for a group of individuals to associate. An example of such an offense
is counterfeiting. 95  If the term "enterprise" is interpreted to include
illegal associations, then a group of counterfeiters could be charged
with conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of rack-
eteering activity (counterfeiting) in violation of Title IX. However,
this type of illegal association is punishable already as a conspiracy. 96
Title IX, with "enterprise" construed as encompassing illegal associa-
tions, is therefore of no real assistance in law enforcement.
Title IX also enumerates federal offenses that would not logically
provide the exclusive impetus for an association of individuals, but
which are committed for the purpose of furthering another interest.
An example of such an offense or racketeering act is bribery of public
officials. 97 It is unlikely that a group of persons would associate
represents a 25.7% increase since 1971. In addition, there were 18,408 filings in the circuit
courts of appeals, which is a 43.9% increase from 1971. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR UNITED STATES
COURTS, 13, 127 (1976). See also Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal
Judge's Thought on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 L. SOC. ORD. 557,
558-61.
94. 18 U.S.C. 9 1961(1)(b) (1970).
95. 18 U.S.C. 9 1961(1)(b) (1970), incorporating 18 U.S.C. §§ 471-73 (1970). Other crimes
enumerated in § 1961(1)(b) which fall into this second class are: 18 U.S.C. 9 659 (theft from
interstate shipment), § 664 (embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), § 1951 (extortion),
29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (embezzlement from union funds). These offenses may be committed for
their own sake. They are not necessarily committed for the purpose of furthering another inter-
est.
96. See, e.g., United States v. LaVecchia, 513 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Efronson, 505 F.2d 104 (5th Cir.
1974).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(b), incorporating 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1970). Other crimes enumerated
in § 1961(1)(b) which fall into this first class are: mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), wire fraud (id. §
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solely for the purpose of committing bribery. The perpetrators would
obviously be furthering another interest which could well be illegal.
For example, the individuals might attempt to bribe law enforcement
officials to overlook their gambling operation which is their primary
interest. However, both the gambling business and the bribery are
already punishable under federal law.9 8 In this situation, again, Title
IX, interpreted to include illegal associations, is of no real assistance.
On the other hand, the primary interest sought to be promoted
through bribery could be legal. For example, the individuals might
attempt to bribe tax officials to overlook tax liabilities of a legitimate
business. In this situation, Title IX provides great assistance. In par-
ticular, the forfeiture provisions require the defendants to release
their interest in the legitimate business to the United States, 99 a
remedy which would not be available otherwise. 100
Hence, Title IX generally yields benefits only when illegal acts are
connected with legitimate organizations. The interpretation of "enter-
prise" to include illegal associations is of no practical assistance in law
enforcement.
In summary, "enterprise," as defined in section 1961(4), should be
interpreted to include legitimate organizations that have been ac-
quired by or sustained through the perpetration of racketeering acts.
There is no significant precedent which should mandate courts to
hold the contrary. The established rules of statutory interpretation
indicate that "enterprise" should not include exclusively illegal associ-
ations. The legislative history persuasively indicates that this was
Congress' intent. Finally, the operation and effect of the application
of the statute demonstrate that the value of Title IX is not magnified
by such an expansive interpretation to "enterprise." Unfortunately,
courts in three circuits have broadened the term in this manner. 10 1
Hopefully, when other circuits confront this problem, they will care-
fully examine the question rather than cite erroneous holdings of
other courts. At this point, a state of confusion exists which only the
Supreme Court can resolve authoritatively.
1343), obstruction of justice, criminal investigations or law enforcement (id. §§ 1503, 1510,
1511), etc. These offenses are committed only for the purpose of furthering another interest.
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970) (gambling business); id. § 201 (bribery).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1970).
100. The forfeiture concept of Title IX represents a revival of an old common law principle.
Forfeiture as a penalty for violation of a criminal statute has not been employed in the United
States since 1790. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SEN-
ATE, S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1969).
101. The Circuit Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth and Seventh Circuits have reached
this holding. See United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
736 (1977); United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Cappetto,
502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
1977]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
C. "Enterprise" as Including Governmental Units
Another issue that has arisen in Title IX's brief history is whether
"enterprise" includes offices or agencies of government. The only re-
ported case to date concerning this question is United States v.
Frumento.10 2  In that case, an investigator for the Bureau of
Cigarette and Beverage Taxes of the Pennsylvania Department of
Revenue was charged with accepting bribes in connection with a
cigarette smuggling operation. The government theorized that the
Bureau was an "enterprise" affecting interstate commerce, and that
the defendant had conducted the Bureau's affairs through a "pattern
of racketeering activity" in violation of section 1962(c). In response to
a motion to dismiss, the court held that the Bureau was properly
characterized as an "enterprise" within the scope of Title IX. 103 In
support of its holding, the court referred generally to Congress' direc-
tion that Title IX be "liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes." 104 The court also cited remarks of Senator McClellan
which indicated Congress' concern that organized crime was corrupt-
ing "the process of our democratic society." 105
An interpretation of "enterprise" as including governmental agen-
cies is not unsound. As the Frumento court implied, Congress was
concerned with the concept of infiltration of legitimate organizations. 10 6
One cannot deny that government agencies are such organizations. In
enacting Title IX, Congress also aimed at the economic consequences
of infiltration. 10 7 Frumento provides a clear example of government
infiltration causing economic harm. The defendant furthered a
cigarette smuggling operation, allowing some individuals to bring
cigarettes into the state untaxed. Legitimate dealers who paid the tax
and passed the cost on to the consumer suffered competitive disad-
vantage and economic harm. Applying Title IX to government agen-
cies, therefore, appears to be congruous with congressional intent be-
cause infiltration and corruption of a legitimate concern has occurred
and honest individuals have suffered economic harm.
102. 405 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. Pa. 1975). It is reasonable to assume that more cases such as
Frumento will arise. At least one such indictment was returned in the Northern District of
Illinois and is now pending trial. See United States v. Blasco, 76 CR 1001 (N.D. I. 1976). In
Blasco, the defendant was a Chicago police officer who allegedly received bribes. He was
charged with violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) for conducting the affairs of an "enterprise" (the
Chicago Police Department) through a pattern of racketeering activity.
103. 405 F. Supp. at 29.
104. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a). 84 Stat. 947 (1970).
105. 405 F. Supp. at 29, quoting 116 CONG. REC. 586 (1970) (remarks of Senator McClellan).
106. See notes 67-75 and accompanying text infra.
107. See notes 76-79 and accompanying text infra.
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However, while such application may be theoretically sound, it has
little practical benefit. In Frumento, the defendant's acts already were
punishable tinder the federal bribery statute. 108 The only novel ben-
efit of implementing Title IX in this case is that it could be used to
require the forfeiture of the defendant's "interest" or position in the
Bureau.' 0 9 Since the defendant probably would have been dismissed
from his position, the advantages of Title IX's forfeiture provisions are
rendered moot.
D. Summary: The Scope of "Enterprise"
Courts have interpreted the term "enterprise" to include foreign
businesses, departments of government, and illegal associations. The
holding that "enterprise" refers to foreign businesses is consistent
with the purpose of Title IX. The inclusion of government agencies is
also quite sound theoretically, although of limited potential value.
Courts that have construed "enterprise" to include purely illegal as-
sociations, however, do not exhibit sound reasoning.
THE MEANING OF "PATTERN OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITY"
In order to establish a violation of Title IX, a "pattern of rack-
eteering activity" must exist. 110 The definition of such a pattern,
provided in section 1961(5), is quite terse: "two acts of racketeering
activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of [Title IX],
and the last of which occurred within ten years ...after the commis-
sion of a prior act.""' In applying that definition, courts have en-
countered two questions which will be examined below. The first is
whether the two acts inust bear some relationship to each other in
order to establish a "pattern." The second is whether the pattern of
racketeering activity must bear a degree of proximity to the essential
functions of the business.
A. Requisite Relationship Between Racketeering Acts
The first case to confront the problem regarding the requisite re-
lationship, if any, between acts of racketeering activity was United
States v. Stofsky. 112 In that case, seven employees of a labor union
108. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1970).
109. Id. § 1963(a). In United States v. Blasco, 76 CR 1001 (N.D. II. 1976), the indictment
prayed that the defendant policeman be required to forfeit his job.
110. See notes 4-5 and accompanying text infra.
111. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1970).
112. 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D. N.Y. 1973).
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allegedly accepted payments from union-shop manufacturers. In re-
turn for the payments, the defendants purportedly allowed these
shops to subcontract work to non-union shops, contrary to a collective
bargaining agreement. In response to a motion to dismiss, the court
held that the term "pattern" was not unconstitutionally vague. 113 It
decided that a pattern required "more than accidental or unrelated
instances of proscribed behavior." 114 In support of its interpretation,
the court referred to Title X of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970,115 which concerns sentencing for dangerous offenders 116 who
have committed a "pattern" of certain criminal conduct.117 The title
provides that "for purposes of [Title X], criminal conduct forms a pat-
tern if it embraces criminal acts that have . . . similar purposes, re-
sults, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise
are interrelated." 118 The Stofsky court reasoned that the Title X
definition of "pattern" also applied to Title IX. The court claimed that
Congress had similar motives in enacting the two titles, therefore,
they should be construed similarly, or in pari materia.119
A close examination of the doctrine of in pari materia, as it relates
to the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, reveals that the Stofsky
court was incorrect. The doctrine of in pari materia provides that,
when the meaning of a statute is ambiguous, it should be construed
together with other statutes which relate to the same subject or have
the same purpose.120
113. Id. at 614.
114. Id. at 613.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1970).
116. Title X sets forth procedures by which a convicted defendant may be sentenced to an
increased prison term if he is proven to be a recidivist, professional offender, or conspirator.
Also, the prosecution must prove that the defendant is so dangerous that an increased sentence
is necessary to protect the public. See McClellan, supra note 60, at 146-86; Organized Crime
Control Act, supra note 8, at 628-50.
117. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)(2) (1970).
118. Id. § 3575(e).
119. 409 F. Supp. at 614. In support of its contention that § 1961 (Title IX) and § 3575 (Title
X) should be construed in pari materia, the court cited United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230
(2d Cir. 1972). The Stofsky court claimed that Becker stood for the principle that statutes
enacted together under the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 should be construed in panI
materia. 409 F. Supp. at 614. This, however, is not true. In Becker, the court construed in pan
materia § 1511 and § 1955, both of which appear in Title VIII. 461 F.2d at 232. Thus, while
Becker may well support the argument that statutes within a title should be construed in par!
materia, it does not stand for the position that different titles under the same omnibus act
should be interpreted likewise.
120. See 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 42, § 51.03 at 298. The purpose of the statutes appears
to be the most critical factor, rather than the thing or object to which they relate. For example,
in Northern Pacific R.R. Co. v. United States, 156 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1946), aff'd, 330 U.S. 248
(1947), the court interpreted the term "war materials" in the Transportation Act of 1940, 49
[Vol. 27:89
ORGANIZED CRIME
In determining whether section 1961 in Title IX and section 3575
in Title X should be construed in pari materia, one must first decide
if the definition of "pattern" in section 1961(5) is ambiguous.12' The
brief provision appears quite clear and can hardly be considered
vague. Therefore, one can argue strongly that the doctrine of in pari
materia should not be applied in this instance.
However, assuming section 1961(5) is ambiguous, sections 1961 and
3575 could properly be construed together only if the two sections
had the same purpose.122  Title IX prohibits certain racketeering acts
that have been committed more than once. 123 The purpose of its
pattern requirement is to make certain that the statute will not be
invoked against defendants who commit an isolated act. 124 On the
other hand, Title X concerns sentencing provisions for dangerous of-
fenders. Its pattern requirement was intended to aid in determining
when an offender is sufficiently dangerous to warrant special sen-
tencing. 125  Thus, Titles IX and X have distinguishable purposes
which should prevent application of the doctrine of in pari
materia. ' 2 6
An additional factor precluding the application of the in pari
materia doctrine is that the very wording of Title X indicates that it
has no bearing on Title IX. The definition of "pattern" in section 3575
begins with the words "for purposes . . . of this subsection." 127 Un-
questionably, Congress did not intend the definition of "pattern" in
section 3575 to influence section 1961.128 It is difficult to understand
why the Stofsky court referred to the doctrine of in pari materia
when these limiting words were present.
U.S.C. § 65(a). The same words were used in other acts such as National Defense Act of 1941,
55 Stat. 655. Although the statutes related to the same thing (war materials), the court did not
construe them in pari materia because they did not have the same purpose. 156 F.2d at 350.
The court also noted that the doctrine is not resorted to when the statute is unambiguous. Id.
121. See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
122. See note 120 supra.
123. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1970).
124. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158, which states:
The concept of "pattern" is essential to the operation of the statute. One isolated
"racketeering activity" was thought insufficient to trigger the remedies provided
125. See McClellan, supra note 60, at 149-54.
126. On the other hand, the Stofsky court felt that "the policies which have led Congress to
create a separate crime for a pattern of criminal activity are not very different from those which
have led it to create increased penalties for a pattern of conduct which is criminal." 409 F.
Supp. at 614.
127. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1970).
128. See generally Waldron v. Leevale Collieries, Inc., 127 W.Va. 443, 33 S.E.2d 227 (1945);
2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 43, § 51.03 at 299.
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Conversely, at least one court has held that acts of racketeering
activity must be somewhat dissimilar before a "pattern" is estab-
lished. This position was suggested by the district court in United
States v. Moeller129 which stated that "the common sense interpreta-
tion of the word 'pattern' implies acts occurring in different criminal
episodes . . . that are at least somewhat separated in time and place
yet still sufficiently related by purpose to demonstrate a continuity of
activity." 130 The decision referred to a Senate Report which stated
that Title IX was not aimed at "sporadic activity." 131
While this theory may comply with "common sense," it appears to
lack valid support. There is nothing in the definition of "pattern"
which suggests that anything other than two racketeering acts within
a ten year period is required to form a pattern.' 3 2 Furthermore,
there is no solid legislative history which indicates that additional re-
quirements should be established. 133 The statement found in the
Senate Report which diverts Title IX from mere "sporadic activity" is
not sufficiently clear to warrant reconstruction of the term "pat-
tern." 134 If other courts are called upon to interpret the word, they,
hopefully, will employ reasoning having a more solid basis than is
apparent in the Moeller court's remarks.
129. 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975). This was not the holding of the case, however, since
the court felt that the circuit court had previously resolved the issue to the contrary in United
States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). In Parness,
the defendants committed two acts of interstate transportation of stolen money only five days
apart. On one of those days, a defendant travelled interstate to a bank to acquire the money. Of
these three racketeering acts, it was held that any two were sufficient to create a "pattern"
under Title IX. The Moeller court observed that, according to Parness, two racketeering acts
occurring on the same day in relation to the same criminal episode form a "pattern." Thus, the
Moeller court believed that Parness barred a holding which required any degree of separation
between the racketeering acts. 402 F. Supp. at 58. In spite of the fact that the judge in Moeller
did not ultimately hold in accordance with his own beliefs, his discussion merits attention,
because other courts could follow his reasoning.
130. 402 F. Supp. at 56.
131. Id. at 58, quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158. The court also stated that
the canon of lenity in construing penal statutes indicated that a degree of separation should be
required between racketeering acts. Id. However, this doctrine is generally applied only when
doubt is raised regarding the meaning of the statute. See notes 50-52 and accompanying text
supra. The definition of "pattern" set forth in Title IX is not ambiguous, but is quite succinct.
See note 120 and accompanying text supra. Thus, there is no need to apply the canon of lenity.
132. See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
133. Indeed, much of the published legislative history behind Title IX contains reports of
organized crime infiltrating legitimate organizations. See notes 67-79 and accompanying text
supra. However, there is little that indicates Congress' interpretation of the term "pattern."
The records reveal that Congress was extremely concerned with infiltration of legitimate
businesses. Congress did not distinguish between infiltration accomplished via a certain "pat-
tern" or through the course of related or unrelated racketeering acts. See generally remarks
cited in note 79 supra.
134. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158.
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There appears, therefore, no persuasive reason to infer that the
term "pattern," as defined in Title IX, refers to anything more or less
than two racketeering acts occurring within a ten year period. The
purpose of the "pattern" requirement was to make certain that the
rather substantial penalties available under Title IX would not be in-
voked against one accused of an isolated crime. 135 Further restric-
tions on the meaning of "pattern" will hinder already inadequate pro-
secutions of racketeers. 136 Had these restrictions been expressed in
the statute, the effectiveness of Title IX would have been sharply
limited. Failure to prove two racketeering acts were sufficiently re-
lated or unrelated would necessitate dismissal. The intended law en-
forcement benefits of Title IX, such as the forfeiture provision, would
be unavailable.
Hence, neither congressional history nor implicit statutory provi-
sions indicate that "pattern" connotes anything other than two acts
within a ten year period. The definition of "pattern" set forth in Title
IX does nothing more than assure that single, sporadic acts are not
punished. Yet, it does not construe a useless impediment to prosecu-
tion. Courts should refrain from adopting an overly stringent in-
terpretation of "pattern" which would upset this delicate balance.
B. Requisite Relationship Between Racketeering Acts
and the Essential Business Functions
A legitimate business can be perverted by criminal conduct in
numerous ways. The tainted act may be closely connected to the
business' main functions. For example, a trucking company could
employ harassing tactics such as extortion or arson in order to force
shippers to transact business with them rather than with competitors.
On the other hand, illicit conduct may be distantly related to the
concern's essential functions. The trucking company, for example,
could manage a gambling operation as a means of partially funding
the business. Because of the conceivable variety of illicit conduct,
defendants in Title IX cases occasionally have charged that the statute
is unconstitutionally vague in that it fails to specify what types of
135. See note 124 supra.
136. In 1969, it was estimated that La Cosa Nostra had between 3,000 and 5,000 members.
115 CONC. REC. 34390 (1969) (letter from G. Robert Blakely, chief counsel of Senate Subcom-
mittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures). However, in the period 1960-1969, only 235 federal
indictments involving 328 defendants had been returned against alleged members of La Cosa
Nostra. Id. Furthermore, organized crime members were able to obtain acquittals in 69.7% of
the cases. Average offenders, on the other hand, achieve an acquittal rate of only 37.8%. Id.
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perversion are prohibited. 137 In particular, this issue has arisen re-
garding section 1962(c), which prohibits the conduct of an enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 138
The clarity of section 1962(c) was attacked in United States v.
Stofsky. 139  In that case, the court held that the statute was not
vague 140 and noted that "[i]t would be futile for a person to argue
that he had no warning or knowledge that his commission of such acts
would violate the law." 141 Significantly, the court added that Con-
gress intentionally failed to specify a requisite relationship between
the racketeering activity and the business itself because "the perver-
sion of legitimate business may take many forms." 142
A brief review of Title IX's legislative history reveals that the
Stofsky court correctly appraised Congress' intentions. Congress was
concerned with the economic harm caused when criminal infiltration
occurs. 143  This harm can result from many types of perversions of
legitimate businesses. In the trucking example above, legitimate firms
are placed in positions of competitive disadvantage when a rack-
eteering firm uses harassment to gain customers or engages in illegal
gambling operations to supplement its trucking receipts. The ways in
which a business can perpetrate illegal acts and cause economic harm
are too numerous to have been enumerated in the statute. An at-
tempt to exhaustively define the scope of the statute would inevitably
have listed only certain types of corruption, excluding equally harmful
variations. Hence, the statute in its present unrestricted form is most
effective. Fortunately, courts that have dealt with this issue after
Stofsky have reasoned similarly. 144 No purpose would be served by
requiring that the pattern bear a particular relationship to the central
137. Such allegations, of course, presuppose that certain peripheral forms of perversion may
not be within the scope of Title IX. However, it appears that Title IX was not intended to be
limited in that manner. See notes 139-141 and accompanying text infra.
138. See note 3 supra.
139. 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D. N.Y. 1973).
140. Id. at 612.
141. Id. The court felt that § 1962 was similar to 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1970), which was upheld
against a vagueness attack in United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1973). 21 U.S.C.
§ 848 prohibits persons from "engag[ing] in a continuing criminal enterprise" which violates
certain laws pertaining to controlled substances. The Stofsky court viewed § 1962 as a "business
regulatory" statute and noted that the Supreme Court, in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972), stated that such statutes are allowed "greater leeway." 409 F. Supp.
at 612-13. Indeed, the court's interpretation of Title IX as "business regulatory" appears quite
sound. See notes 75-78 and accompanying text supra.
142. 409 F. Supp. at 613.
143. See notes 75-78 and accompanying text supra.
144. See, e.g., United States v. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014 (W.D. Pa. 1975); United States
v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Wisc. 1974).
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functions of the business and nothing in the statute or its legislative
history indicates that this is required.
C. Summary: The Meaning of "Pattern"
In order for criminal acts to constitute a "pattern," Title IX clearly
requires only that two racketeering acts be committed within a period
of ten years. It is improper to infer from other statutes that the acts
must bear some similarity to each other. In addition, the pattern
need not bear a certain degree of proximity to the essential functions
of the corrupt business. Congress wisely chose to deal with all modes
of tainting organizations. There is no reason to assume that only cer-
tain types of corruption are prohibited.
ARE DEFENDANTS REQUIRED TO BE MEMBERS OF
"ORGANIZED CRIME?"
A final issue that has arisen in Title IX's brief history is whether its
prohibitions apply only to defendants who are members of organized
crime. Two cases have dealt with this question and have reached op-
posite conclusions.
In Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 145 the plaintiff alleged that the defen-
dant, a telephone answering service, had conducted its business
through repeated acts of mail fraud. In its civil suit, 146 the plaintiff
moved to amend the complaint to include a count under Title IX,
alleging that the affairs of the enterprise had been conducted through
a "pattern of racketeering activity." The court denied the motion,
stating that there was "nothing to suggest that [the] defendant is con-
nected in any way with organized crime." 147 Referring to congres-
sional history, the court noted the continual use of words such as
"syndicate" and "Mafia" and reasoned that only members identified
with those groups are subject to prosecution under Title IX.'148
In contrast, the court in United States v. Campanale 149 held that
defendants are not required to be members of organized crime. In
that case, the court reasoned that although Congress focused on the
activities in which organized crime members commonly engaged,' 50
145. 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D. N.Y. 1975).
146. Civil suits may be brought under § 1964. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
147. 66 F.R.D. at 113.
148. Id.
149. 518 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nor. Matthews v. United States, 423
U.S. 1050 (1976).
150. Id. at 363.
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the words of the statute were general and the prohibited acts were
unlawful regardless of the identity of the perpetrators. 151
The Campanale court offered the proper interpretation of Title IX.
Admittedly, congressional intent was to combat the activities of or-
ganized crime groups such as the "Mafia." 152 However, the only
logical way to accomplish this is by concentrating on the types of
offenses committed by organized crime members. 153 To require a
showing that the defendant is affiliated with organized crime would
unnecessarily burden prosecutions. 154 Furthermore, it would pre-
clude recourse against some instances of economic harm merely be-
cause the defendant was not identified with a criminal society. The
Barr court appears to have misinterpreted Congress's plan. Hope-
fully, other courts will not.
CONCLUSION
When courts are faced with the necessity of interpreting a recently
enacted statute, they often employ various aids to discern the mean-
ing of the legislation. Rules of statutory interpretation assist the
courts in construing the language of the statute. Congressional com-
mittee reports enable the judiciary to determine Congress' intent in
enacting the legislation. Also, the effect of the operation of the statute
can indicate what purpose Congress hoped to attain in creating the
law.
Unfortunately, several courts have ignored or misused these tools
in interpreting Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.
As a result, Title IX has been both unjustifiably expanded and un-
necessarily restricted in some areas. This situation should warn the
legislature and the public that courts have the power, through im-
proper use of statutory construction, to distort the meaning of a stat-
ute from that intended by the legislature. Hopefully, further judicial
interpretations of Title IX will follow established rules of statutory
construction and, as a result, render decisions that coincide with the
intent of Congress.
David J. Novotny
151. Id. at 363-64.
152. See notes 73-76 and accompanying text supra.
153. This apparently was Congress' approach. See McClellan, supra note 60, at 60-62; Wil-
son, The Threat of Organized Crime: Highlighting the Challenging New Frontiers in Criminal
Law, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 41, 48 (1970).
154. See note 136 and accompanying text supra.
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